The huge news footprint of the Shiavo story has left news from Iraq on the back pages. However, the Iraqi war is entering a new phase--a phase where both failure and success are on the table in a new way. In short, the "Insurgency" that U.S. forces have been engaging for the last two years cannot succeed on its own--conditions in the country must change for any serious anti-U.S. political regime to arise in Iraq. However, the ethnic, religious and tribal difficulties that have sharpened recently could provide the catalyst for a wholesale change for the worse in Iraq. Should these difficulties be overcome, the first steps towards an establishment of a stable, democratic Iraq can be taken. Should these difficulties prove intractable, the result could be fatal for the U.S. mission for Iraq.
The "Insurgency" as it is known, is really made up of two insurgencies. One was designed by Saddam Hussein and his loyalists along traditional lines as an asymmetrical counterweight to overwhelming U.S. firepower. The second is a much smaller group of foreign terrorists whose media savvy has created an image that is much larger than its actual strength on the ground. Neither has the power alone to win political power in Iraq without a major change in the course of the Iraqi nation. Unfortunately for the U.S., such a change in the political course of the nation is more likely to occur now than at any other time.
The Sunni Insurgents
The Sunni Insurgents appear to be paid for and armed by a loose group of former Baathist/tribal leaders who have much to lose in the new Iraq. They are certainly responsible for the majority of attacks in Iraq. They may collaborate with the foreign terrorists from time to time, but are not led by them. Their strength is their weakness. As a decentralized force apparently designed to inflict damage on American occupation forces, they are able to avoid wholesale destruction through cell structure. However, they appear to lack any real political leadership. Some links with the Association of Muslim Scholars exist, however, there is no Sunni insurgent leader who can move masses--a necessary ingredient to a successful insurgency.
The Foreign Fighters
These groups are more terroristic in nature. The best known is Tanzim Qa'idat Al-Jihad in Bilad al-Rafidayn, or Al-Qaeda in Iraq, led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. The group is much smaller than the Sunni insurgency groups, but cuts a larger media profile through its combination of video executions with internet-savvy. Furthermore, the Bush Administration in the lead up to the 2004 elections placed a heavy emphasis on al-Zarqawi as an insurgent leader because his existence made it easier to link the September 11 attacks to the invasion of Iraq. Of late, the foreign fighters, have focused their attacks on Shia in order to provoke ethnic strife in the country.
The Threat to Iraq's Future
The attacks on Shia have intensified because the real threats to a unified Iraq come from two potential sources: (1) generalized ethnic strife and (2) Shia alienation from a democratic, Western-backed Iraq. Generalized ethnic strife could create the type of chaos that an anti-U.S. leader could exploit to rise to power in Iraq. Should such a leader emerge in these conditions and gain mass adherence of Iraqis, it is doubtful the U.S. could remain in the country. Similarly, if the Shia population became alienated and coalesced around a leader such as al-Sadr, the difficulties for the U.S. could become unbearable.
Whither Iraq?
The question is, therefore, whither Iraq? The last two months have seen a decrease in U.S. casualties--but the current wrangling over the Iraqi power structure could prove the undoing of the relative stability of recent weeks. Another unknown is Iran. It is thought that Iranian state actors play a large role in supporting Shia leaders in Iraq--with various Iranian factions supporting differing brands of Iraqi Shia political groupings and styles. This support has played an unknown role in shoring up the Shia and the Iraqi regime as a result. Should the U.S. launch an attack on Iran, the Mullahs in Tehran could counter by fomenting trouble in Iraq.
The cost of the Iraq adventure has been high for the U.S. The nation has taken its eye off of the ball in the fight against global terrorism and instead finds itself fighting homegrown terrorists in Iraq. Currently the state of Iraq is hopeful, but should the political solution fail, America has a long way to fall in Baghdad.