How does a man whose entire political career has been purposely built around not offering "specifics" on anything suddenly reverse course and do just that?  He can't.  The Bush people look at their Iraq problem as a PR problem not a policy problem and seek to treat it as such, however their lack of credibility on Iraq is due not to a lack of specifics, but to a lack of realistic assessment of the situation coupled with optimistic pronouncements about "turning a corner" in Iraq that are easily refuted by actual events and a continued worsening of the security situation in many parts of the country. 

Let's look at the Administration's greatest hits list:  Liberate Iraq, nope didn't quite go as planned.  Capturing Chemical Ali and the rest of Saddam's ministers, nope, in fact Chemical Ali was "confirmed killed" three times during the invasion only to be captured eight months later.  Kill Saddam Hussein's sons, nope.  Capture Saddam Hussein, nope, still hasn't crippled the insurgents.  Put down revolt in Najaf, nope.  Recapture Fallujah, nope.  Elections, nope, moving experience but a weak government in a failed state doesn't inspire confidence or provide security.  Training hundreds of thousands of Iraqi troops, nope, more likely to find the recruits singing folksongs to Saddam and threatening to quit.  Ring Baghdad with 40,000 troops and police, nope.

Let's face it, we don't have any realistic plans for accomplishing our utterly non-specific goals in Iraq.  I'm reminded of Clark Clifford's memoir when as the newly appointed Secretary of Defense in March 1968 he convened a series of meetings with the Joint Chiefs, State Department and other foreign policy professionals on Capitol Hill and asked them point blank what our strategy was to "win" the war in Vietnam.  To his shock the Joint Chiefs told him that they didn't have one; attrition, escalation and hope for a political settlement with Hanoi was it.   Of course, this was after hundreds of billions of dollars spent, over 20,000 men killed, and, true to form, General Westmoreland's report on the aftermath of the Tet Offensive which unknowingly suggested that 120% of the NVA and Viet Cong troops estimated to have taken part in the offensive were either killed or wounded...

VandeHei should know better, but I guess I'll be looking for the "specifics."